Key Takeaways:
- Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force sent three F-2 fighters and about 110 personnel from the 8th Wing to Jodhpur for Veer Guardian 2026 (Sept. 9–21), the first Japanese fighter deployment to an Indian base and the second edition after Hyakuri in 2023; the IAF flew Tejas, Su-30MKI, and Rafale in air-combat, intercept, and air-defence drills.
- The air exercise sits with Dharma Guardian (army, Chaubatia) and JAIMEX-2025 (navy, including a Yokosuka port call), plus ACSA logistics, 2+2 talks, and August 2026 meetings between Rajnath Singh and Shinjiro Koizumi after PM Sanae Takaichi’s India visit.
- Planned next steps include joint shipbuilding and repair, UNICORN mast transfer via BEL, DRDO–ATLA R&D, drones, and shared maritime pictures from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific—tempered by slow past deals (US-2), Japan’s Article 9 export limits, and offset mismatches. The authors say execution, not more communiqués, will decide whether Quad-adjacent interoperability lasts.
India-Japan defence cooperation reached new heights with the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) or joku-jietai conducting Exercise Veer Guardian 2026 from 9 to 21 September 2026 with the Indian Air Force (IAF) at station Jodhpur, Rajasthan. This 14-day bilateral air combat exercise was to improve the tactical proficiency of units and engage in air-combat manoeuvring (ACM) with the Indian Air Force. The exercise was the first time the JASDF sent three Mitsubishi F-2 fighter aircraft from its 8th Wing, based at Tsuiki Air Base in Fukuoka Prefecture in south-western Japan. Around 110 personnel from the 8th Air Wing participated in the exercise and involved air combat training against fighter aircraft. While the aircraft travelled to India via Naha Air Base in Okinawa and Thailand, the US Air Force provided aerial refuelling during the aircraft’s visit to Thailand.
This exercise was the second edition of Exercise Veer Guardian, first held at Hyakuri Air Base in Japan in January 2023. The JASDF participated in the exercise with F-2 and F-15 aircraft, while the Indian contingent was represented by the Su-30 MKI, C-17 Globemaster strategic airlift transport aircraft, and one IL-78 flight refuelling aircraft. The two sides engaged in air combat manoeuvring, interception, and air defence missions within Visual and Non-Visual ranges at the time. Interestingly, the aircrews of the two forces had flown each other’s aircraft to better comprehend each other’s operational principles.
Veer Guardian 2023 laid the foundation for fighter-to-fighter cooperation, while the deployment of Japanese fighters to India adds a new dimension to the exercise. This is particularly significant for Japan as it seeks to strengthen its ability to contribute to wider regional security.
The exercise demonstrates the growing strategic trust between the two sides, reflected in the conduct of military exercises with the tri-services. The Veer Guardian exercise came close on the heels of Dharma Guardian conducted by the Indian Army and the Japan Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF) at the Foreign Training Node in Chaubatia, Uttarakhand. It focused on military cooperation at the tactical level and included the establishment of a temporary operating base, the development of indigenous Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and the conduct of heliborne operations.
This exercise also followed the conduct of the Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JAIMEX)-2025, which saw the conduct of advanced Anti-Submarine Warfare and missile defence drills, and the enhancement of interoperability through the conduct of flying operations and underway replenishment during the sea phase of the exercise. The harbour phase of the exercise saw the conduct of cross-deck visits, collaborative operational planning, and sharing of best practices. More importantly, the port call at Yokosuka was critical as it demonstrated India’s ability to conduct long-range naval deployments in the Indo-Pacific region.
Anuttama Banerji and Wing Cdr A Pichipoo Raja of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies observe that these “developments are a reflection of the operationalisation of the ‘Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership’, which constitutes a key pivot in the array of strategic partnerships that India pursues within its broader Indo-Pacific.”. Indeed the exercise entails operationalising the India-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), a key logistics support agreement along the lines of agreements that India has signed with several other partners. Article 1(a) and Article 2(2) of the agreement refers to reciprocal provisions and supplies as well as training and the conduct of joint and combined exercises.
Anuttama and Raja further explain that Exercise Veer Guardian serves a dual purpose: it extrapolates the growing relevance of air power and situates the exercise as a critical pillar within the exercises that are being conducted between India and Japan. They further clarify that it expands operational coordination between India and Japan, symbolising the exercises broadening and deepening bilateral ties between the two nations reflecting the strategic trust structurally embedded in the broader bilateral partnership.
This high-tempo bilateral fighter-combat exercise conducted by the air forces of India and Japan was aimed at developing tactical air-combat interoperability, fine-tune point aerial operational concepts, and enhance mutual defence cooperation, including aerospace safety. Among the key features of the exercise was that this was the first ever Japanese fighter deployment to India that operated from an Indian air base for bilateral combat drills. It also saw diverse frontline fleet integration by deploying a multi-type fleet from the IAF, comprising indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, multirole Su-30MKI, and Dassault Rafale jets, training directly alongside Japan’s F-2A multirole fighters. Because Japan’s F-2A shares its core airframe lineage with the American F-16 Falcon, the drills afforded the IAF critical tactical experience countering and integrating with an F-16 derivative platform. The exercise itself was a case of comprehensive Ground and Aerospace Interactions as it helped integrate air combat simulations with engineering roundtable, joint debriefs, subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs), and aerospace maintenance protocols.
Another significance of the exercise is that it helps strengthens Quad security, besides improving defence interoperability and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Given the JASDF experience in long-distance deployment and diverse flying conditions alongside Indian aircraft, it expands Japan’s operational reach.
The exercise also demonstrates the transition of India-Japan defence ties to operational convergence. This milestone was achieved following Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi’s visit to India in August 2026 and discussion with his counterpart Rajnath Singh on operational interoperability, naval shipbuilding and defence technology transfer under Make in India program. Koizumi’s visit followed the successful visit of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to India demonstrating that both India and Japan are committed to the shared Indo-Pacific defence and security.
India and Japan share a Special Strategic and Global Partnership, historically anchored in diplomatic frameworks such as the Annual Summit mechanism, the ministerial 2+2 Dialogue involving Foreign and Defence Ministers, and mutual logistics arrangements under the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). While political convergence on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has matured, practical defence cooperation has historically lagged. This wrong is now being corrected to give a push to the momentum already kicked in by a series of meetings by top political leaders from either side.
The key pillars and recent breakthroughs are (1) Joint Naval Shipbuilding and Reciprocal Ship Repair, (2) Fast-Tracking the UNICORN Antenna System, (3) Expanding R & D and Institutional Linkages, (4) Elevating Tri-Services Joint Exercises and (5) Shared Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
As regards 1, both sides agreed to explore joint development in naval warship design, integrating Japan’s advanced marine engineering with India’s domestic shipyard manufacturing capacity. This also involves deepening discussions on utilising production infrastructure under Make in India and establishing reciprocal access to military ship repair and maintenance facilities. 2. The Unified Complex Radio Antenna is a stealth integrated mast system that houses multiple communication and radar antennas within a single composite structure, drastically reducing a warship’s radar cross-section (RCS). Building on the November 2024 Memorandum of Understanding involving Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), both governments committed to early implementation, marking Japan’s first major defence equipment transfer to India under Tokyo’s revised Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology.
3. Another highlight is to expand R & D and institutional linkages by co-development of pipelines between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Japan’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) to overcome the implementation bottlenecks that hampered the 2015 Defense Technology Transfer Agreement.
4. The fourth highlight was to elevate Tri-Service Joint Exercise. This was seen in Veer Guardian Exercise in September 2026 between the JSDF fighter aircraft deployed to India for the first time to exercise with the IAF. This also included an agreement to introduce unmanned combat system (drones), conduct short-notice contingency drills to test operational readiness, and integrate Japan’s SDFs with India’s upcoming Integrated Theatre Commands.
5. The fifth highlight was on sharing Maritime Domain Awareness. This meant linking real-time operational feeds between the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Western Pacific/East China Sea creating an end-to-end maritime operating picture across critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS).
The above-mentioned are laudable targets, most of which are achievable in agreed time-frame and based on the developments in the region. But there are challenges in implementation. The past experience indicates slow pace of historical defence deal. Despite signing the 2015 agreement on defence technology transfer, major high-profile projects, such as the planned procurement of ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft, is stalled over price negotiations, local production quotas, and technology-sharing disputes. Secondly, there still exist legal and constitutional limits on Japanese exports. Although Japan has revised its defence export rules, constitutional constraints under Article 9 and complex parliamentary oversight in Tokyo continue to make lethal weapon co-development politically sensitive.
Thirdly, there remain differences in procurement and industrial norms. Aligning India’s indigenous manufacturing standards and offset rules with Japan’s proprietary defence manufacturing processes requires substantial inter-agency harmonisation. Fourthly, balancing coalition dynamics, which means balancing between Quad and bilateral ties, is another challenge. Sustaining bilateral momentum requires insulating India-Japan operational initiatives from shifting external political postures or trace tensions within the broader Quad grouping.
So what is the way forward? First is delivering concrete co-development projects. This would mean prioritising the timely assembly and integration of UNICORN masts on Indian vessels through BEL to establish credibility for future technology co-production. Second is Finalising Reciprocal Shipyard Logistics Agreements. This would mean formalising master ship-repair agreements enabling JMSDF vessels to undergo scheduled refits and logistics replenishment at Indian commercial and naval shipyards.
Third is Deepening Drone and Autonomous Systems R & D. This would mean joining funding and co-developing autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and high-altitude maritime surveillance unmanned systems tailored for littoral surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Fourth: Utilizing the upcoming fourth Foreign and Defence Ministerial 2+2 meeting to establish a formal roadmap linking operational theatre commands and real-time intelligence-sharing protocols.
It transpires therefore that by anchoring cooperation in joint naval shipbuilding, advanced sensor transfers, and expanded aerial and maritime exercise, New Delhi and Tokyo are creating an interconnected security framework across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Turning this strategic convergence into lasting regional stability will depend on executing joint manufacturing agreements and sustaining operational momentum on the ground.
The Veer Guardian exercise demonstrates the growing convergence and depth of the bilateral partnership between India and Japan in the military domain, with both conceptual as well as operational engagement being given a priority. This holistic engagement now envisaged at multiple levels is indicative of growing mutual trust.
With the success of Veer Guardian exercise, it is expected that the spectrum of cooperation envisaged during the India-Japan Defence Ministers’ Meeting at New Delhi on 20 August 2026 is just a beginning for many more such future exercises in the future aimed at maintaining regional peace and stability.
