Key Takeaways:
- The author says a decade of Kyrgyz-led talk of a Central Asian “Schengen” (visa-free among members, common external visa) is heating up after summer 2026 tourist bottlenecks, but a full copy of the EU model is still unlikely. Japarov pitches tourism and growth; others, especially Turkmenistan, treat borders as sovereignty and a filter against threats. Russia now has visa-free access to the region and would lose a relative advantage; China is cited as wary on the Afghan frontier after attacks on its personnel.
- What is gaining ground is “Schengen-minus”: a shared short-stay tourist visa so one stamp can cover several countries, without giving up internal travel bans in restive areas (Tajikistan and Turkmenistan on the Afghan border). Longer-stay rules—the ones Moscow and Beijing care about most—look unchanged. A Turkic counterpart to Interpol and talk of a “Central Asian” identity are treated as extra fuel, not a done deal. Adding Azerbaijan would raise the stakes.
- The real point, for the author, is regional agency versus outside bilateral leverage—and a piece of the “collapse of the Russian Empire” read region-wide, not state by state.
For almost a decade, some Central Asian leaders, Kyrgyzstan’s in particular, have called for a Schengen-style visa-free regime across the region to let citizens move easily between countries and promote tourism (Orda, March 31, 2025; Azattyq Asia, September 6). Now, after many fits and starts, interest in some arrangements similar to those in the European Union—which has created the original Schengen accord to allow visa-free travel among them behind a common visa regime for others both at the external border of the union and at national borders as well—is growing (Azattyq Asia, September 5; Asia Plus, September 16). To be meaningful, such a regime would require establishing a common external visa border, something many Central Asian governments, which view it as a threat to their recently gained sovereignty and control over restive regions within them, oppose (Instagram/@bright_uzbekistan, September 14).
Outside powers, in this case the Russian Federation in particular, would oppose it, as they have maintained influence over the region through special visa-free relations with these countries compared with others (Facebook/Information For Thought, September 17). For these reasons, the prospect that the governments of Central Asia will take this step any time soon, particularly as they expand the region to include Azerbaijan, remains small. The discussion alone matters because it highlights those governments’ growing interest in cooperating, even at the expense of outside ties.
Advocates of a Schengen zone for Central Asia, such as Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Jarapov, have argued that such an arrangement will boost tourism and economic development in the region (Orda, March 31, 2025). His counterparts in other Central Asian countries, however, traditionally have been less enthusiastic given that they want to retain control of state borders both as a demonstration of sovereignty and as a means of blocking the entrance of those who may pose a terrorist threat to their regimes, with Turkmenistan the least interested (Azattyq Asia, September 5; Asia Plus, September 16). At the same time, some in the Russian Federation—which at present has no visa regime with any of the Central Asian countries, although some in Moscow would like to impose one to control immigration—have expressed concern about any change that might eventually restrict its current freedom of action in comparison with other countries (Azattyq Asia, September 5).
Until this summer, these opponents, both domestic and foreign, appeared to have prevented discussions in Central Asia from becoming more immediately serious. Now, as regional moves to cooperation have expanded, especially in the wake of the decision to create a Turkic counterpart to Interpol for the region, they have been re-energized (Instagram/@bright_uzbekistan, September 14; Asia Plus, September 16). At the end of July, Japarov received more support for his proposal to create a common visa regime for tourists. Since then, discussions about what to do next have expanded (Asia Plus, September 16).
The proximate cause of this shift is the difficulties expanding tourism this summer have created for the countries of Central Asia. Long lines at the border and visa requests have overwhelmed the capacity of these countries’ diplomatic representations abroad. All would like to reduce these problems. The main issue in discussions about changes is the internal restrictions some countries have placed on travel because of instability. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan on the Afghan border are especially opposed to any changes that might undermine their security. In this they are backed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has seen its personnel attacked there (Window on Eurasia, November 27, 2024).
At present, those favoring some changes to the existing visa regimes for Central Asian countries appear to be gaining the upper hand, at least for short-term tourism. Advocates of allowing those who get visas to one country to visit others in the region argue that foreign tourists make an important contribution to Central Asian economies and that most want to visit more than one country because of the costs of getting to the region in the first place. As a result, support for a common tourist visa regime is growing. Opposition to any change in each country’s ability to restrict travel to troubled regions, however, remains strong. There is little evidence that any of the countries are ready to change the visa regime arrangements for those staying longer periods, precisely the people that the Russian Federation, the PRC, and other outside countries care most about. (For a survey of these discussions, see Asia Plus, September 16.)
Support for what might be called “Schengen-Minus” appears to be emerging. This would not be a full-blown copy, as some media coverage has suggested, but a limited one that would make it easier for tourists to visit Central Asia without making changes that would challenge Moscow’s or Beijing’s ability to exploit the existing situation. Going further than that in the coming months is unlikely, but the desire of Central Asian leaders, who have recently achieved so much progress so quickly in overcoming obstacles, means it cannot be ruled out. After all, some in the region are now urging that the populations identify in the first instance as Central Asians rather than as citizens of individual countries (Window on Eurasia, August 13).
To the extent that ideas like that gain traction, the push for a common visa regime could continue. This will encourage the governments of the region but spark new opposition from Russia and even the PRC, given the advantages they now have in influencing the decisions of individual countries that they might lose under a new visa regime.
Looming behind these immediate concerns in Moscow and Beijing is the larger fear that Central Asia as a whole is going to be able to play a larger role than any one of the countries in that region has been able to since becoming independent. This is especially the case if Azerbaijan is added to it. This acquisition of agency by a region rather than just an individual country is an important part of the continuing collapse of the Russian Empire, something that is typically measured country by country rather than by region. For that reason alone, the discussion in Central Asia of even a partial move to Schengen-style controls represents something far more important than a glance at what many may feel is simply a question of bureaucratic convenience might suggest.
