By Sreeparna Banerjee
Key Takeaways:
- The piece frames a 2 Sept. 2026 Manipur home-minister update—about 55 km of the state’s 398-km Myanmar border fenced, rest aimed at 2028—plus a 26 May 2026 document (The Diplomat, July) on a possible ~1.4 sq mi / 3.5 sq km exchange between pillars 65–68 (Chandel / Kabaw Valley). MEA on 4 Aug. said some sectors remain unsettled and talks continue; it did not confirm a swap.
- History: colonial Pemberton Line after Yandabo (1826) and 1834 Kabaw restoration; 1967 India–Myanmar agreement; ~1,472 of 1,643 km pillar-marked, ~171 km still open. After Myanmar’s 2021 coup, New Delhi treats an undemarcated line as a barrier to fencing, patrols, and crime control. FMR (1968/2018, 16 km) was suspended then ended (MHA, 8 Feb. 2024); Dec. 2024 protocol: 10 km with biometric border passes.
- A swap, if ever agreed, is compared to the 2015 India–Bangladesh LBA and Berubari (1960): surveys, a treaty, Article 368 amendment, then pillars, records, and residents’ rights. Civil-society worries over villages and farmland.
The India-Myanmar border is back in the spotlight, not because the boundary itself is new, but because questions over how it should be demarcated are once again attracting attention. On 2 September 2026, Manipur’s home minister stated that, of the state’s 398-km border with Myanmar, around 55 km has been fenced, with the entire stretch targeted for completion by 2028.
Meanwhile, a reported government document dated 26 May 2026, cited by The Diplomat in July, has fuelled speculation over a possible territorial exchange. The document refers to the unresolved stretch between Boundary Pillars 65 and 68 in Manipur’s Chandel district and reportedly proposes exchanging around 1.4 square miles (3.5 sq km) of territory with adjoining Myanmar’s Kabaw Valley in the Sagaing Region. The reported proposal has not been confirmed as a decision. On 4 August, a Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson acknowledged that “there are certain areas on the border which are yet to be settled” and that “discussions on those sectors are ongoing,” but stopped short of confirming any territorial adjustment.
The issue cannot be understood without examining how the boundary came into existence. The 1,643-km frontier is largely an inheritance of the colonial era, shaped by the Treaty of Yandabo (1826) and subsequent boundary arrangements. In 1834, the British restored the Kabaw Valley to the Kingdom of Burma and tasked Major F.J. Grant and Captain Robert Boileau Pemberton with defining the Manipur-Burma boundary, giving rise to what became known as the Pemberton Line. These successive boundary-making exercises did not always correspond with pre-existing patterns of social, cultural, and economic interaction, and communities such as the Nagas, Kukis, and Mizos subsequently found themselves living on either side of an international frontier.
After independence, India and Burma sought to regularise the inherited boundary through the 1967 India-Myanmar Boundary Agreement, which established the modern alignment and created a Joint Boundary Commission for its physical demarcation. Around 1,472 km has since been demarcated through boundary pillars, leaving approximately 171 km unresolved. The present debate, therefore, is not about reopening the entire frontier, but about addressing the specific pockets where the boundary has yet to be conclusively demarcated on the ground.
A New Urgency for Demarcation
The renewed push for demarcation needs to be understood against a much wider transformation in India’s approach to its eastern border with Myanmar. For decades, the frontier was managed as a relatively porous border in which security considerations coexisted with considerable cross-border social and economic interaction. The situation has changed considerably since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021. The intensification of conflict in Myanmar, the movement of armed groups and displaced nationals, and the expansion of transnational criminal networks have heightened India’s concerns about maintaining effective control over the frontier.
Border infrastructure has consequently become a central component of India’s security policy. India has been pursuing fencing in identified stretches of the 1,643-km boundary, alongside efforts to strengthen patrolling and surveillance. An unresolved boundary line creates an obvious practical difficulty: where stretches remain undemarcated, the construction and alignment of permanent border infrastructure becomes more complex. Demarcation is therefore not simply a cartographic exercise; it is increasingly central to the effective planning and implementation of a comprehensive border-management system.
The changing security environment also includes insurgency, narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and other forms of transnational crime. The India-Myanmar frontier connects India’s Northeast with Myanmar’s conflict-affected areas and, further east, the wider Golden Triangle. Undemarcated stretches can complicate surveillance and coordination between the two sides. For New Delhi, clearly established boundary coordinates can strengthen the legal and administrative basis for fencing, patrolling, and monitoring movement.
The FMR Question
The debate over demarcation is closely connected to India’s decision to end the Free Movement Regime (FMR). The FMR, which has existed since 1968 and was formalised in 2018, was designed to recognise the distinctive social and ethnic character of the India-Myanmar border, where communities on either side of the international boundary have longstanding familial, cultural, and economic ties. Under the earlier arrangement, eligible residents living close to the border could cross up to 16 km into each other’s territory without following normal visa or passport procedures, subject to specified conditions.
This arrangement reflected a reality the colonial boundary had never erased. Communities such as the Nagas, Kukis, and Mizos have long maintained social, familial, and economic ties across what later became an international border. The border, then, has never been merely a line separating two sovereign states; for many communities, it has also been a shared space of livelihood, education, healthcare, kinship, and marriage.
Security concerns over unrestricted movement have gained greater prominence in New Delhi’s approach to border management in recent years. The Manipur border with Myanmar has faced tighter movement restrictions since 2022, when the FMR was suspended amid Myanmar’s deteriorating security situation and concerns over a growing influx of Myanmar nationals. The porous border has also remained a major route for narcotics trafficking, compounding New Delhi’s border-security concerns.
On 8 February 2024, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced its decision to scrap the FMR, citing internal security and the need to preserve the demographic structure of India’s northeastern states bordering Myanmar. The MHA also recommended its immediate suspension while the Ministry of External Affairs undertook the formal process of ending the arrangement. However, in view of the familial ties on either side of the border, the Centre introduced a stricter replacement protocol in December 2024, allowing movement within 10 km with biometric screening through border passes issued to residents at designated crossing points.
Fencing the border has consequently become a key component of New Delhi’s border-management approach. The shift towards a more regulated movement regime marks a significant departure in India’s handling of a historically porous frontier, and makes physical demarcation considerably more consequential: greater regulation of movement and stronger physical border controls increase the need for clarity and precision in the boundary’s alignment.
At the same time, eliminating the FMR cannot by itself resolve the socio-economic consequences of a hardened border. Communities that have traditionally crossed the frontier for agriculture, trade, religious activities, medical treatment, or family reasons could face higher costs and administrative barriers. A successful border-management policy will therefore have to reconcile security requirements with the legitimate interests of border communities.
Is a Land Swap on the Table?
The possibility of a territorial exchange has attracted particular attention because of the proposed arrangement in the Molcham sector. Reports suggest that a territorial adjustment involving approximately 1.4 square miles has been discussed in connection with the disputed stretch between Boundary Pillars 65 and 68.
It is important, however, to distinguish between a proposal under examination and an agreed territorial settlement. The available reporting indicates that the proposal is being considered as a means of resolving a difficult section of the boundary; it does not establish that India has agreed to any transfer of territory, nor does it suggest that a final land swap has received the necessary governmental approvals.
The rationale for considering an exchange is essentially practical. If the existing boundary alignment produces an awkward or contested configuration on the ground, a mutually negotiated adjustment could, in theory, establish a clearer and more manageable boundary. Any such adjustment would, however, carry wider legal and administrative implications, and would bear directly on local communities and their customary land-use practices. Civil society organisations have already raised concerns on this front, particularly over the potential impact on villages, agricultural land, and established land-use patterns.
What Would a Territorial Swap Require?
India already has a precedent for negotiated territorial adjustment in the 2015 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), under which the two countries exchanged enclaves and settled outstanding boundary issues. Its implementation required the Constitution (100th Amendment) Act, 2015, demonstrating that any transfer of sovereign territory involves more than a bilateral administrative decision.
A similar India-Myanmar arrangement would likely require joint surveys and precise demarcation to establish the territory involved, followed by a formal bilateral agreement defining the revised boundary, boundary pillars, and implementation arrangements. Given the principles set out in the Berubari judgment (1960), any proposal to transfer Indian territory would need to proceed through Article 368, the constitutional amendment procedure, rather than through ordinary legislative or executive action.
The final stage would involve ground-level implementation: relocating or installing boundary pillars, updating maps and land records, and determining the status of affected residents, including their residence, land and property rights, documentation, and, where applicable, compensation or rehabilitation.
The process would ultimately have to balance strategic border management with the rights and livelihoods of communities living along the frontier. The broader challenge, therefore, is to clarify and secure the boundary while accounting for the social and economic interests of communities that have long lived across it.
- About the author: Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme.
- Source: This article was published by Observer Research Foundation
