Key Takeaways:
- The 26 October Tehran quadrilateral of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and Iran advances a possible expansion of the Mecca Pact into reciprocal security assurances amid risks of renewed U.S.-Israeli strikes.
- The proposed Mecca Pact+1 would rest on mutual non-retaliation and non-facilitation pledges plus agreed investigation procedures and reciprocal reconstruction of damaged infrastructure.
- The talks could aid wider U.S.-Iran mediation on Hormuz and sanctions, but lasting settlements require direct bilateral talks and must not expose regional states to external wars they did not start.
The quadrilateral meeting held in Tehran on 26 October 2026, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and Iran, represents a significant development towards the broader regional security framework proposed earlier in October, extending cooperation beyond collective military defence. According to Reuters, as published by Channel News Asia, the meeting followed a visit to Tehran the preceding week by Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, during which Iranian officials subsequently confirmed that the initiative for quadrilateral consultations had been proposed. The resulting diplomatic engagement offers an opportunity to translate these proposals into practical commitments and provide a possible foundation for negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
The urgency of such an arrangement has increased following reports of preparations for renewed American and Israeli military operations against Iran, raising the prospect of retaliation against neighbouring Gulf countries. As Reuters reported on 1 October, Tehran was considering stronger retaliation, potentially extending to countries supporting American military operations. This concern was reinforced by Iran’s Foreign Ministry on 4 October, which warned of consequences if neighbouring territories were used for renewed attacks against Iran. For Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the central question is whether their security and economic infrastructure should remain exposed to military confrontation initiated by outside powers.
Geographical proximity should not create military liability
The possibility of extending the Mecca Pact’s purpose beyond conventional military defence was examined in an Anadolu Agency analysis published on 11 August and subsequently in Dealing With Non-State Actors: The Mecca Pact’s Real Test. The proposal was developed further in OPEC’s Warning: Time to Widen the Mecca Pact, published on 10 October, and Beyond Deterrence: Bringing Iran, Iraq and Kuwait into the Mecca Pact’s Regional Security Framework, published on 22 October. These contributions proposed a wider arrangement involving Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, with particular emphasis on reciprocal security assurances, maritime protection and mutual reconstruction.
The Tehran initiative follows a similar diplomatic direction, although this correspondence does not establish that it originated in those recommendations. Iran’s Foreign Ministry has described the consultations as a possible foundation for further regional cooperation, while the Saudi account has emphasized reducing tensions and supporting diplomatic mediation. The reference to Lebanon in the Tehran discussions is particularly encouraging, as it suggests that regional cooperation may extend beyond relations among governments to conflicts involving armed groups. A similar approach could contribute to political settlements in Yemen, where the Houthis remain central to the conflict, and in Iraq, where some armed factions continue to operate with considerable autonomy. Greater understanding with Iran could help reduce regional tensions and encourage restraint, but lasting settlements must remain the responsibility of the countries concerned, with full respect for their sovereignty and national institutions.
Non-retaliation and the responsibility of participating states
The proposed Mecca Pact+1 arrangement, bringing Iran into a wider security understanding with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, should rest upon reciprocal undertakings. Iran would agree not to attack participating countries in retaliation for military operations undertaken by outside powers where those countries have neither participated in nor facilitated the attacks. The other participants would, in turn, undertake not to allow their territories, airspace or military facilities to be used for unlawful operations against Iran. Such assurances would establish a distinction between responsibility for an attack and the geographical or political association of neighbouring states with those responsible.
The difficulty lies in determining whether these commitments have been respected. During a military crisis, allegations concerning the use of foreign bases, airspace or territorial waters can rapidly become grounds for further attacks. To prevent accusations of involvement from becoming grounds for retaliation, the participating countries should establish agreed procedures for investigating disputed military incidents. These could include the exchange of relevant information concerning airspace, maritime movements and the use of military facilities, together with independent technical examination where necessary. Such procedures must respect legitimate national security restrictions while providing sufficient evidence to distinguish actual participation in an attack from suspicion arising merely from political alliances or geographical proximity. The undertakings must also address armed groups operating with the support or assistance of participating governments. An agreement would be of limited value if prohibited military operations could continue indirectly through non-state actors.
Such commitments would not remove any country’s lawful right of self-defence. Their main purpose would be to prevent the wider regional consequences of an attack from being determined by suspicion or political association rather than established responsibility.
Mutual reconstruction and the economic foundations of security
To consolidate the proposed Mecca Pact+1 arrangement and give it a durable foundation, the participating countries should establish a reciprocal commitment to assist one another in repairing damage caused by military attacks originating outside the framework. Such an undertaking would strengthen mutual confidence by transforming security cooperation from a commitment to refrain from aggression into a practical responsibility for one another’s recovery. Beyond its immediate humanitarian and economic benefits, this arrangement would create a shared interest in preventing further hostilities, protecting essential infrastructure and preserving regional stability, even when political differences persist.
Under this arrangement, all participating countries, including Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and Iran, would undertake to provide reciprocal assistance in restoring essential civilian and economic infrastructure damaged by external military attacks, irrespective of which participating country was affected. Such assistance could include technical expertise, specialised equipment, construction materials and financial support, according to each country’s capabilities and the scale of the damage sustained. Priority would be given to petroleum and energy installations, electricity generation, water desalination facilities, ports, hospitals and transport networks, whose disruption could have consequences extending well beyond national borders. By establishing mutual reconstruction as a shared responsibility, the framework would reinforce the principle that the security and economic stability of each participating country are matters of common regional concern.
Much of this cooperation could be arranged in advance through existing engineering companies, equipment suppliers and financial institutions. Participating governments might establish emergency financing procedures and agree on the circumstances in which assistance could be requested and provided. Such preparations would allow recovery to begin without having to negotiate every practical detail after an incident.
A further distinction is necessary between immediate assistance and legal responsibility for damage. Providing regional support would not relieve any state responsible for an internationally wrongful act of its obligation to make reparation. Reconstruction could proceed while questions of responsibility and compensation were addressed separately.
Beyond these practical considerations, the proposed cooperation also reflects a principle deeply rooted in the shared Islamic heritage of the participating countries. The Qur’an states: “And cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression” (Al-Mā’idah, 5:2). This principle provides a moral foundation for reciprocal assistance in rebuilding what has been destroyed, while equally rejecting participation in aggression against neighbouring states.
A wider initiative to end the US–Iran confrontation
The Tehran consultations could also provide a basis for a wider diplomatic initiative aimed at ending the confrontation between the United States and Iran. Working alongside existing mediation efforts, the participating countries could seek to facilitate negotiations on the cessation of hostilities, the restoration of safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the gradual removal of financial and economic restrictions in return for agreed and verifiable commitments. Such an initiative would recognise that lasting regional security requires more than military restraint among neighbouring countries; it also requires addressing the disputes that continue to expose them to external confrontation.
The continued interruption of navigation through Hormuz has consequences extending beyond the immediate belligerents. It affects petroleum exports, international shipping, insurance costs and the reliability of supplies to importing economies. Restoring safe commercial passage should therefore be a principal objective of any settlement, accompanied by agreed measures concerning American naval restrictions on Iranian maritime commerce.
Iran’s restricted funds abroad and the sanctions affecting its financial transactions, petroleum exports and foreign trade would also need to be addressed. A settlement could begin with arrangements for access to funds intended for essential imports and humanitarian requirements, followed by wider sanctions relief as reciprocal obligations are fulfilled.
In return, Iran would be expected to accept verifiable commitments concerning maritime security, non-aggression and outstanding issues involving its nuclear programme. The United States would likewise need to undertake corresponding obligations concerning military de-escalation and the removal of agreed restrictions.
These measures cannot be imposed by the Mecca Pact countries. They would require negotiations between Washington and Tehran, together with the relevant legal authorizations. The regional participants could nevertheless facilitate dialogue, help identify mutually acceptable arrangements and support implementation in matters directly affecting Gulf security and commercial navigation.
The sequence would be important. Neither party could reasonably be expected to fulfil all its obligations while remaining uncertain whether the other would reciprocate. An agreement would therefore need to connect each significant concession with a corresponding undertaking and a reliable means of verification. The diplomatic experience of Pakistan and Qatar provides an existing foundation for this work. Rather than establishing a competing mediation process, the expanded Mecca Pact could contribute its political influence and regional security interests to those efforts.
The political moment and the Pact’s international standing
The timing of the Tehran initiative deserves particular attention. It comes immediately before Israel’s parliamentary election on 27 October and shortly before the American midterm elections on 3 November 2026, amid reports that renewed military operations against Iran remain under consideration. The newly elected members of Congress will not assume office until 3 January 2027. President Trump’s administration will meanwhile retain its executive authority over foreign and military policy. This interval gives particular importance to diplomatic efforts intended to prevent renewed hostilities, although neither the timing nor the outcome of the elections should be regarded as determining whether military action will occur.
There is no evidence that the meeting was scheduled specifically to take advantage of either electoral event. Nevertheless, the approaching elections add uncertainty to an already unsettled diplomatic situation. A regional initiative offering a practical alternative to renewed hostilities would be relevant regardless of their outcomes. Iranian officials have also identified Israeli military policies, developments in Palestine and Lebanon, and the consequences of American and Israeli operations against Iran among the subjects requiring discussion. These concerns reflect the wider danger that confrontation between external and regional powers may result in prolonged military and economic exhaustion across the Middle East.
The interests of Saudi Arabia and its neighbours should not be subordinated to that possibility. Nor should the proposed framework become an instrument of confrontation with the United States or Israel. Its purpose would be to preserve the independence of regional decision-making, protect participating countries from unlawful attacks and contribute to peaceful settlement of disputes. If the Mecca Pact countries could help secure a settlement between Washington and Tehran, their international standing would be strengthened by a contribution extending beyond collective military defence. Restoring navigation through Hormuz and reducing the danger of renewed war would serve not only regional interests but also those of the wider international economy.
The possible participation of Iraq and Kuwait would add further importance to the framework. Both countries have substantial interests in Gulf security and petroleum transportation, and their involvement could widen cooperation without necessarily extending the original Pact’s collective-defence obligations to every participant.
The Tehran consultations also present an important question concerning the purpose of the Mecca Pact. Collective defence against aggression must be distinguished from participation in military pressure intended to compel another country to accept demands advanced by an external power. The Pact should not be used to enforce American demands upon Iran through threats of military action. Its purpose should remain the protection of participating countries, the preservation of their independence in matters of national security and the peaceful settlement of regional disputes. Saudi Arabia, in particular, should not allow its security or economic interests to become dependent upon military decisions taken in Washington or Tel Aviv.
The opportunity ahead
The Tehran meeting is an encouraging development, but it would be premature to regard it as an agreement resolving the differences among the participating countries. Its importance lies in the opportunity it presents to establish practical understandings that could prevent another military confrontation from spreading across the region.
The immediate priority should be to secure an explicit undertaking that Saudi Arabia and the other participating countries will neither participate in nor facilitate military attacks against Iran by outside powers. In particular, Saudi Arabia should make clear that any decision by the Trump administration or the Netanyahu government to launch a preventive or purportedly pre-emptive attack against Iran would not constitute a Saudi decision or commitment. Saudi territory, airspace and military facilities should not be made available for unlawful operations of this nature. Equally, Iran should undertake not to retaliate against Saudi Arabia or any other participating country for attacks in which they have taken no part. Neither geographical proximity nor political and military relations with outside powers should, in themselves, constitute grounds for retaliation.
To give these assurances lasting substance, the proposed Mecca Pact+1 arrangement should also provide for mutual assistance in the event of damage caused by external military attacks. Whether the affected country is Saudi Arabia, Iran, Türkiye or Pakistan, the others should be prepared to contribute, according to their capabilities, to repairing essential civilian and economic infrastructure. Such assistance would not relieve those responsible for the destruction of their obligations under international law. It would, however, demonstrate that the participating countries have a common interest in protecting the stability and economic well-being of their neighbours, even when political differences remain.
By reducing the possibility of neighbouring countries becoming involved in conflicts initiated by outside powers, the Mecca Pact countries and Iran could also contribute to diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the confrontation between Washington and Tehran, restoring secure commercial navigation and creating more favourable conditions for resolving other regional disputes.
Collective defence remains an essential responsibility of sovereign states, but it should not become a means of involving neighbouring countries in wars initiated by outside powers. The proposed reciprocal assurances and reconstruction commitments would help ensure that regional security serves the interests of the participating countries rather than exposing them to the consequences of external military decisions.
The wider purpose of Mecca Pact+1 should therefore be to protect the independence and security of its participating countries while contributing to the peaceful settlement of disputes beyond their borders. The Tehran initiative offers an opportunity to establish such an understanding. Its lasting value will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their common interest in peace into commitments that prevent neighbouring countries from becoming casualties of conflicts they neither initiated nor supported.
