Key Takeaways:
- The 15 October 2026 Diliman Dialogues argued that Southeast Asians must shape South China Sea peace and cooperation themselves rather than accept external narratives.
- Speakers rejected a forced China-or-U.S. choice, urging strategic autonomy, functional cooperation consistent with law, and recognition of the economic costs of strained Philippines-China ties.
- Divergences persisted over shelving disputes versus protecting UNCLOS claims, yet the forum produced practical steps on dialogue, a Code of Conduct, incident management and evidence-based policy.
Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea and intensifying major-power rivalry, the 2nd Diliman Dialogues, held on 15 October 2026 at the Philippines-China Studies Center of Diliman College in the Philippines, advanced a simple but powerful proposition that peace, friendship, and cooperation in the region cannot be dictated by narratives produced elsewhere. They must be shaped by Southeast Asians themselves.
The forum brought together scholars from China and from the five founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Also participating were Chinese Ambassador to Manila Jing Quan, former National Security Adviser Clarita R. Carlos, former Senator Anna Dominique “Nikki” Coseteng, lawyer-politician Atty. Raul Lambino, Filipino Chinese Friendship Association President Danny Sze, academics, and civic leaders. Held during the Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship, the forum provided a rare platform for candid regional dialogue.
The event underscored the importance of regional agency in addressing one of Asia’s most consequential security challenges. It advanced the central message that Southeast Asia should not merely serve as an arena for great-power competition but should actively shape its own strategic future.
Why Southeast Asian Voices Matter
The South China Sea is Southeast Asia’s immediate neighborhood. Its fishers, coastal communities, and trading economies bear the direct costs of instability. Yet the region’s story is often narrated by actors outside the region.
Former Senator Coseteng, President of Diliman College, emphasized the importance of dialogue, mutual respect, and regional understanding. She argued that ASEAN’s future should not be defined solely by narratives produced beyond the region or by the preferences of external powers. Instead, Southeast Asians must help shape the conversation based on their own experiences, interests, and aspirations. As she observed, dialogue does not require agreement; it requires a willingness to listen, understand, and engage before passing judgment. In this way, dialogue itself contributes to friendship and confidence-building.
In his remarks highlighting the first anniversary of the Philippines-China Studies Center, Rommel Banlaoi, the center director, backed President Marcos Jr.’s “reset” in Philippines-China relations as a pragmatic way to ease tensions. He cautioned that the reset works only if all government departments, including the security and military establishments, support it in action. The reset rests on the view that the Philippines can firmly assert its sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea while still cooperating with China, its “permanent neighbor,” and maintaining its partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia, and others. He concluded that a truly independent foreign policy rejects the “either China or the US” dichotomy and makes the Philippines a bridge rather than a battleground, and that Southeast Asian voices should shape ASEAN-China relations, including the push for a Code of Conduct during the Philippines’ 2026 ASEAN chairmanship.
A Shared Strategic Architecture and the Rejection of False Choices
Ambassador Jing’s keynote address began from remarkably similar premises. He argued that Philippines-China relations have reached a sensitive juncture that demands prudence, balance, and issue-specific engagement. He stressed that bilateral ties cannot be judged simply as “good” or “bad,” noting that while maritime disputes continue to generate friction, cooperation in trade, diplomacy, law enforcement, and people-to-people exchanges remains robust. Calling for restraint in the South China Sea, he urged both sides to avoid provocations, manage disputes through dialogue, and prevent maritime tensions from overwhelming the broader relationship.
The ambassador highlighted expanding trade, tourism, connectivity, and law enforcement cooperation as evidence that the relationship retains significant strategic and economic value for both countries. He encouraged greater Philippine engagement with China, stronger investor confidence, and deeper people-to-people exchanges, while criticizing what he described as discriminatory actions against Chinese nationals and institutions.
On foreign policy, Jing rejected the notion that Manila must choose between Beijing and Washington, arguing that the Philippines can maintain constructive relations with both powers while prioritizing its own national interests. He concluded by reaffirming China’s commitment to regional peace, stability, and mutually beneficial cooperation with the Philippines and Southeast Asia.
Dr. Carlos supported this view when she argued that the Philippines must pursue strategic autonomy and overcome its security dependence on the United States. The logic of her argument is that a country reliant on a single security partner has less room for independent judgment, and that its choices in the South China Sea risk being shaped by the priorities of others rather than by its own national interests. As the way forward, she called for more functional cooperation in the South China Sea, meaning practical collaboration on shared concerns that does not wait for the sovereignty disputes to be settled.
Friendship and Cooperation as Foundations of Peace
Congressman Antolin A. Oreta III, Chairperson of the House Special Committee on the West Philippine Sea, described the accomplishments of the Committee and reaffirmed its commitment to advancing the Philippines’ maritime rights through legislative action in accordance with international law. He stressed that this legal and legislative track goes hand in hand with peaceful dialogue and practical cooperation with the other claimants. His message thus showed that defending maritime rights and pursuing dialogue are complementary rather than competing tasks, and it gave the Philippine legislature a visible place in the country’s approach to the South China Sea.
Atty. Lambino, speaking as President of the Association for Philippines-China Understanding (APCU), welcomed the Dialogues as a place where Southeast Asian voices have a seat at the table and argued that cooperation begins with understanding that comes “from the heart” (mula sa puso), so that friendship between Filipinos and Chinese is built through conversation, shared experience, and mutual respect rather than agreements and official visits alone. He devoted his remarks to technology, especially artificial intelligence, as the force that will shape the region’s future more than any other. Small and middle nations, he observed, have too often been the stage on which larger powers played out their rivalries, and those that escaped this pattern did so by building capability in their people, industries, food systems, and technology while keeping the freedom to choose their partners wisely. He pointed to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore, which chose a balanced and independent course and were rewarded with progress as well as peace.
Mr. Sze, President of the Filipino Chinese Friendship Association (FCFA) organized his message around three themes: peace, friendship, and cooperation. He held that political differences between governments should not damage the friendship between the two peoples, and that the real question is how such differences are managed, whether allowed to grow into greater divisions or addressed through patient and sincere dialogue. He recalled two historical occasions, the 1986 meeting between Vice President Salvador Laurel and Deng Xiaoping and the 1988 visit of President Corazon Aquino, occasions on which Deng proposed setting the maritime disputes aside temporarily while exploring peaceful solutions and, later, joint development. Sze argued that protecting national interests and maintaining peaceful relations are not contradictory.
Taken together, messages by all speakers gave the forum’s central premise legal, strategic, and relational foundations. Oreta emphasized the legal and legislative defense of maritime rights, Lambino emphasized capability, technology transfer, and the freedom to choose partners, and Sze emphasized dialogue and joint development. Lambino’s call for a balanced and independent course echoed the strategic autonomy urged by Carlos and Banlaoi, while Sze’s invocation of Deng Xiaoping’s approach of shelving disputes closely paralleled Ambassador Jing’s advocacy of joint development, with Sze adding the qualification that any such framework must be consistent with domestic and international law. The messages also complemented Coseteng’s observation that dialogue builds friendship and confidence. Together they suggest that friendship is not a substitute for defending national interests but the condition under which dialogue, restraint, and compromise become possible.
ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN-China Relations
Under the provocative title “ASEAN Centrality (?)”, Carlos presented a skeptical assessment of ASEAN’s current condition. She pointed to the absence of a unified collective voice, the growing preference for bilateral over multilateral diplomacy, the constraints imposed by consensus decision-making, the limited capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat, intensifying major-power rivalry, and the reputational costs of ASEAN’s inability to address the Myanmar crisis effectively. Her proposed remedies focused on practical and nontraditional security concerns: a regional fisheries agreement, environmental stewardship, a rapid-response capability for disaster relief and climate emergencies, and fuller implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045.
Dr. Enrico Gloria of the University of the Philippines expressed a more optimistic view when he underscored ASEAN’s potential as a platform for constructive engagement with China. He argued that China’s stated principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness become more credible when pursued through ASEAN-led institutions. He pointed to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the ongoing negotiations on a South China Sea Code of Conduct as examples of such engagement, noting that RCEP has created a shared framework for regional trade and supply chains, while regular consultations and practical cooperation keep relationships active despite persistent disagreements. He further emphasized that ASEAN shapes the agenda and institutions through which Southeast Asia cooperates with external partners, ideally through a collective voice, and that regional forums keep channels of communication open even during periods of tension.
Serving as reactor, Dr. Carlos Tabunda Jr., Dean of the School of International Relations at New Era University, advanced a stronger case for ASEAN agency. He argued that centrality requires tangible substance rather than rhetorical repetition. ASEAN must become an agenda-setter rather than merely a venue where others pursue their interests. For him, smaller states exercise influence collectively through institutions, international law, diplomatic coalitions, and economic coordination, all of which can shape the environment in which major powers operate. He stressed that the goal is not to erase power asymmetries but to prevent them from becoming the sole determinant of regional outcomes. In the South China Sea, ASEAN centrality may mean preventing maritime disputes from undermining the broader regional order even when those disputes remain unresolved.
Although these three perspectives broadly converged on the importance of ASEAN centrality, they differed in emphasis. Carlos questioned whether ASEAN currently possesses the institutional capacity to fulfill the expectations placed upon it. Gloria focused on China’s responsibility to match rhetoric with consistent action. Tabunda stressed ASEAN’s agency and normative influence. Despite a shared vocabulary, they attached different strategic meanings to concepts such as centrality and regional order.
Southeast Asian Perspectives on ASEAN-China Relations
Speakers from Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and Bangkok situated the maritime dispute within a broader framework encompassing trade, connectivity, human security, and regional order. Their interventions demonstrated that, throughout Southeast Asia, the South China Sea dispute is important but remains only one of many interconnected regional concerns.
Mr. Siswanto Rusdi of Indonesia’s National Maritime Institute argued that ASEAN-China maritime cooperation is expanding through the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, with growing collaboration in trade, port development, connectivity, the blue economy, and maritime infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the upgraded ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 3.0, and RCEP. He highlighted China’s increasing involvement in ASEAN ports, the strategic significance of the newly opened Pinglu Canal in strengthening trade links between China’s interior and Southeast Asia, and Indonesia’s experience of combining maritime cooperation with China in areas such as scientific research, environmental protection, capacity building, security exercises, and energy transition. At the same time, he emphasized that maritime cooperation remains constrained by sovereignty concerns, particularly in the North Natuna Sea, and warned that ASEAN countries must remain vigilant to ensure that economic opportunities do not undermine national interests.
Dr. Peter Chang of the Malaysia-China Friendship Association offered a Malaysian perspective that began with the durability of Malaysia-China ties, which have reached their 50th anniversary and have endured five prime ministers in five years. He placed these ties within Malaysia’s domestic context, where ethnic dynamics, electoral politics, and national politics all bear on Sino-Malaysian relations. On the South China Sea, he acknowledged the territorial disputes and conflicting claims while stressing the interests that Malaysia and China also share. He concluded that Malaysia’s neutrality means not taking sides but performing a balancing act between the major powers.
Dr. Lye Liang Fook of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute emphasized ASEAN’s practical achievements in confidence-building. He noted that when Singapore chaired ASEAN in 2018, it co-organized the ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise, ASEAN’s first such exercise with a dialogue partner, demonstrating that maritime cooperation can proceed despite unresolved territorial disputes. He further noted that a second ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise is scheduled for 2027 and that Singapore’s Navy and Army, along with the armed forces of other ASEAN member states, have conducted exercises with their Chinese counterparts. These efforts, he argued, show that meaningful cooperation remains possible when sovereignty questions are temporarily set aside in favor of trust-building measures and practical engagement.
Dr. Chaiwat Meesantan of Thammasat University argued that ASEAN-China relations should be viewed through a broader lens that extends beyond the South China Sea disputes. He emphasized that the maritime question comprises three interconnected dimensions: territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and rules, and strategic competition, all of which require careful management through diplomacy and regional cooperation. Thailand, he noted, views the South China Sea as important not only because of competing claims but also because maritime connectivity, regional production networks, predictable rules, and ASEAN cohesion contribute to economic resilience and regional stability.
Lessons Learned for Philippines-China Relations and the Peaceful Management of Conflicts
From regional perspectives to lessons for Philippines-China relations, economic cooperation emerged as the area of greatest convergence between Ambassador Jing’s keynote speech and the scholarly insights of Chinese and Southeast Asian participants.
Dr. Tang Xiaoyang of Tsinghua University argued that maritime disputes should not define the entirety of Philippines-China or ASEAN-China relations. He emphasized the importance of dialogue, communication, and crisis-management mechanisms to prevent escalation in the South China Sea. He also underscored that economic, educational, trade, and people-to-people exchanges remain important stabilizing factors in Philippines-China relations despite maritime tensions, a point that resonated with the opening messages of Lambino and Sze.
Mr. Lucio Pitlo III drew attention to comparative indicators showing that Chinese tourism, investment, and imports from the Philippines lag significantly behind corresponding flows involving Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and even Cambodia and Laos. He noted that deteriorating relations with China, the Philippines’ largest trading partner, have adversely affected tourism, investment, and trade, contributing to the country’s inability to recover its pre-pandemic level of 1.74 million Chinese tourist arrivals recorded in 2019. He further observed that political risk and worsening bilateral ties have complicated the realization of earlier Chinese investment pledges, while China’s imports from the Philippines remain far below those from other ASEAN economies, highlighting the economic opportunity costs of strained relations. For Pitlo, these trends underscore the need for a coherent, stable, and enduring China policy.
Ambassador Jing largely agreed with this diagnosis, noting that Chinese investment in the Philippines remains lower than in many other ASEAN member states. The disagreement lies primarily in explaining the causes. Jing attributed the shortfall largely to deteriorating bilateral relations and declining investor confidence, whereas Pitlo identified the domestic politicization and securitization of Philippines-China relations, together with inconsistent policy signals, as major contributing factors.
Dr. Alvin Ang of Ateneo de Manila University placed these concerns within the wider ASEAN-China economic picture. He noted that ASEAN has been China’s largest trading partner for six consecutive years, while China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner for seventeen years, underscoring the centrality of the relationship to the region’s economic future. He further argued that the acceleration of ASEAN-China trade has been driven by tariff-related trade diversion, the relocation of production networks to Southeast Asia under the “China+1” strategy, and the implementation of RCEP and the upgraded ACFTA 3.0. At the same time, he observed that the Philippines has not fully capitalized on these opportunities, as reflected in its relatively low share of Chinese manufacturing investments in ASEAN and its US$29.1 billion trade deficit with China in 2025. Ang recommended leveraging the Philippine ASEAN chairmanship, maximizing opportunities arising from ACFTA 3.0, promoting Philippine agricultural and food exports, attracting investment into carefully selected non-sensitive sectors, and restoring Chinese tourism through improved air connectivity.
Convergences and Divergences
An important point of convergence emerged on the question of great-power competition. Ambassador Jing’s rejection of a forced choice between China and the United States found echoes in the remarks of Tabunda, who defined ASEAN centrality as neither neutrality nor alignment with any particular power; Chang, who presented Malaysia’s neutrality as a balancing act without taking sides; and Chaiwat, who emphasized strategic autonomy as a core principle of foreign policy.
Yet this apparent agreement concealed important differences. Jing’s concept of balance implied avoiding participation in the front lines of strategic competition. Several Philippine speakers, however, viewed balance as compatible with stronger defense and security partnerships with countries such as Japan, Australia, and other like-minded states, while Carlos tied strategic autonomy to reducing the Philippines’ security dependence on the United States. Thus, consensus existed on the principle of balance, but not necessarily on its operational meaning.
Law, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Functional Cooperation
The most significant substantive divide concerned law and sovereignty. Ambassador Jing argued that the maritime dispute may remain unresolved for decades. He advocated shelving disputes, pursuing joint development, maintaining safe distances at sea, avoiding provocations, and reducing the public amplification of maritime incidents. Notably, his published remarks did not explicitly reference UNCLOS or the 2016 Arbitral Award.
Chaiwat, while equally supportive of cooperation, approached the issue from a different legal perspective. He distinguished sovereignty over territory from maritime entitlements, affirmed UNCLOS as the governing legal framework, and emphasized that cooperative initiatives should not prejudice the legal positions of participating states. His recommendations included collaboration in search and rescue operations, marine scientific research, fisheries management, and training exchanges, all aimed at strengthening human security and improving everyday livelihoods.
The difference between “shelving disputes and jointly developing resources” and “cooperating without prejudicing legal claims” represents one of the central policy challenges in the South China Sea. Functional cooperation may create areas of overlap between these approaches, but only if agreements are carefully designed to avoid implications regarding sovereignty or maritime entitlements. Oreta’s commitment to legislative action in accordance with international law, paired with peaceful dialogue and practical cooperation with claimants, points in the same direction. Sze’s suggestion that joint development be studied within the bounds of domestic and international law marks one possible overlap, and Lambino’s emphasis on technology transfer and capacity-building suggests another. In each case, the friendship and cooperation they urged must be translated into practice through agreements and mechanisms that build trust without compromising either side’s legal position.
Points of Friction
Two issues generated the greatest disagreement. The first concerned Chinese-language education. Coseteng raised concerns regarding the departure of Chinese-language teachers and called for evidence-based policymaking and due process rather than rhetoric that could intimidate educators. Ambassador Jing likewise expressed concern about pressures affecting Chinese-language education and what he characterized as selective enforcement against Chinese nationals.
Although both sides viewed the situation as problematic, their explanations differed considerably. The organizers emphasized the need for evidence-based discussion of security concerns. Jing attributed these developments to anti-China sentiment and external political pressures, a claim that remains contested.
The second issue involved domestic policy coherence. Banlaoi in his opening message, Pitlo, and Jing all expressed concern about inconsistent policy signals. Pitlo emphasized domestic policy fluctuations within the Philippines, while Jing attributed some instability to the influence of external actors. Jing’s references to successful joint law-enforcement operations and declining kidnapping incidents suggest areas where bilateral cooperation remains effective, although these figures were presented from the Chinese perspective.
Assessment and Policy Takeaways
The forum’s principal strengths lay in its regional diversity, its inclusion of a sitting Chinese ambassador alongside critics and skeptics, and its emphasis on actionable policy recommendations. At the same time, several limitations were evident. The absence of speakers from Vietnam and Brunei, both claimant states in the South China Sea, left important perspectives unrepresented. Likewise absent were senior representatives of the Philippine defense and security establishment and independent specialists in international maritime law. Despite these limitations, eight policy lessons emerge from the discussions:
- Sustain friendship and people-to-people cooperation between the Philippines and China and pursue functional cooperation, including technology transfer and the study of joint development consistent with international law, as a foundation for resolving conflicts in the South China Sea peacefully.
- Advance the Philippines’ maritime rights through legislative action consistent with international law, as the House Special Committee on the West Philippine Sea has committed to do, while promoting peaceful dialogue and practical cooperation with other claimants.
- Treat the reset in Philippines-China relations as an institutional project by aligning diplomatic, defense, law-enforcement, and educational messaging.
- Use the Philippine ASEAN chairmanship to advance an effective South China Sea Code of Conduct and strengthen cooperation in fisheries, marine science, search and rescue, and disaster response while safeguarding legal positions.
- Decouple economic cooperation from maritime disputes whenever possible and prioritize tourism, agriculture, food exports, and selective investment.
- Establish robust hotline and incident-management mechanisms to operationalize the principle of maintaining safe distances at sea.
- Invest further in Philippine expertise on China and encourage evidence-based public discourse on national security issues.
- Continue refining what policymakers mean by “balance” and strategic autonomy, concepts repeatedly invoked throughout the forum but defined differently by almost every speaker.
Conclusion
The 2nd Diliman Dialogues demonstrated that Southeast Asian voices are not merely desirable; they are indispensable. Peace, friendship, and cooperation in the South China Sea, as well as stable Philippines-China relations, will be more durable when the region’s own scholars, diplomats, policymakers, and communities play a direct role in defining both the challenges and the solutions. In a period of growing geopolitical competition, the forum served as a reminder that Southeast Asia is not merely an arena where great powers compete but a region capable of shaping its own strategic future.
