Home NovaAstrax 360 Indonesia’s Concentric Circles – OpEd

    Indonesia’s Concentric Circles – OpEd

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    Key Takeaways:

    • The article proposes “concentric circles of strategic cooperation” as a framework for Indonesia’s foreign policy, beginning with national resilience in maritime affairs, food, energy, industry, technology and climate, then expanding outward through neighbours, ASEAN, the Indo-Pacific, major powers and global governance.
    • It stresses practical priorities such as nickel downstreaming, Malacca Strait security, ASEAN economic integration and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, while advocating diversified ties with the United States, China, Europe and Russia to avoid dependence.
    • The piece concludes that strategic autonomy ultimately depends on converting flexibility into consistent, coordinated policies that link domestic strength with regional influence and selective global partnerships.

    Free and Active (Independent and Active), ASEAN centrality, and strategic autonomy are the core of Indonesia’s foreign policy. However, a fragmented international environment marked by great power rivalry, economic transformation, technological change, and increasing uncertainty in multilateralism requires a more solid and crystal-clear foreign policy to transform diplomatic independence into concrete benefits.

    However, the concept of “concentric circles of strategic cooperation” is an analytical framework useful for mapping Indonesia’s interests. At the core is the need to develop and sustain national resilience, and then to develop and sustain strategic cooperation with other countries in circles of increasing radius: countries near Indonesia, ASEAN, the broader space of the Indo-Pacific and the major countries of the world, and, finally, global governance.

    National resilience, the foundation of foreign policy: Foreign policy is to support the development of the nation. Independence, territorial integrity, political sovereignty, as well as economic development of Indonesia have always been the objective of foreign policy since the country gained its independence. Now, foreign policy also aims to develop and strengthen national resilience, particularly in terms of maritime affairs, food, energy, industry, technology, and climate change, to increase foreign policy autonomy and independence by dealing with and addressing commodity dependence as well as weaknesses in human resources and infrastructure, and overcoming supply-chain disruptions and dependencies on technology.

    In order to support foreign policy, there is a need for foreign investment. This will enable foreign investment to bring about technology, to develop and strengthen domestic enterprises, and to generate employment. It is imperative that the downstream nickel processing policy and a commitment to become part of the electric vehicle supply chain enable the country’s processing to be done within its territories and to develop its domestic enterprises in order to secure independence.

    The second circle of strategic cooperation encompasses Indonesia’s immediate neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, as well as Papua New Guinea and Australia. Their foreign policies could affect Indonesia’s border, maritime, migration, trade, and security interests. In this regard, cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore to ensure safe shipping through the Strait of Malacca, as well as combating piracy and transnational crimes, is crucial. Moreover, Indonesia’s cooperation with Australia in terms of maritime surveillance, intelligence, and counterterrorism efforts is important. However, geography is not sufficient to ensure trust and good relations. Disputes over maritime territories, illegal fishing activities, human trafficking, and historical grievances need to be addressed through continuous communication, effective border management, and confidence-building measures.

    In terms of its relations with other countries in the region, the basis of Indonesia’s foreign policy remains intact, as laid down by the founding fathers of the country since independence, namely to support and defend peace, development, and freedom in the region and world. These relations, under the auspices of ASEAN since 1967, can translate into collective influence by virtue of the country’s geographical position and diplomacy if these are optimally channelled. For this end, the country needs to support the strengthening of ASEAN as a vehicle of influence for the country and the region by promoting economic integration, connectivity, and digital cooperation, and also by developing strong capacity to handle crises. The realization of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, in concrete terms, is very important for the country to be able to increase its influence and play a leading role in the organization and in the region.

    The Indo-Pacific is a crucial area where Indonesia’s strategic interests interact with those of many major countries including China, Japan, India, South Korea, the US, Australia, and several Pacific Island states. The objective of Indonesia’s foreign policy in this area would be to promote an inclusive order in the region which is premised on a commitment to dialogue, openness, and cooperation. It is equally important that Indonesia defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity in line with the country’s national interests. Relations with the US are crucial, particularly to obtain support for Indonesia’s defence and to secure technology transfer from the developed country. The economic interests of Indonesia also make it crucial for the country to maintain good relations with other major countries in the region such as Japan, South Korea, India, and China. Engagement with Pacific Island countries can also be intensified to prepare for the crucial role that the countries can play in facing the challenges of climate change, particularly in marine affairs.

    Influencing Major Powers. Major foreign powers and global powers that include the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia are contained in this strategic circle. In these relations, Indonesia can choose a number of different approaches and need not treat all foreign countries with equal distance. A number of agreements can be pursued with Washington in the area of maritime security, with Beijing in the area of infrastructure development, with Europe in the area of technology, while with Moscow there are a number of economic issues on which cooperation can be pursued. In the face of global supply chains and advanced technologies becoming politicized, it is therefore necessary to pursue a policy of diversification so as to avoid dependence and in order to gain leverage in negotiations with foreign countries.

    The foreign policy to support the promotion of global governance within the framework of international relations as envisioned by Indonesia is guided by the principle of the 1955 Bandung Conference, that is, the struggle for independence and cooperation of underdeveloped countries. In efforts to implement this principle, Indonesia participates in global relations through the United Nations, G20, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and other international fora to encourage institutional reform, sustainable human development, and action to address climate change, as well as to increase the influence of the Global South. How effective Indonesia’s foreign policy participation is can be measured by the results obtained, not by how visible it is.

    All these circles have one weakness: the difference between ambition and the implementation of policy and action. The many institutions already in place can be reinforced by economic development, which will make the country more competitive. Furthermore, there must be better coordination between the public and private sectors and between different policy instruments (foreign and defense policy, economic development, technology and diplomacy) that need to be harmonized.

    These six circles of strategic cooperation should not be perceived as a hierarchical conceptualization. The country’s capacity for strategic independence to make and implement choices is a function of national strength, sound and stable immediate neighbors, the highest level of influence in ASEAN to push and steer the organization and to ensure that its shared interests are safeguarded and promoted, and a varied and wide network of strategic relationships with several major powers from all over the world. The structural asset that the country has is to be able to connect and to bring together its several strategic interests with several strategic partners, in a flexible manner and without being overly dominated by another. A challenge for foreign policy is to convert this flexibility into a set of integrated and strategic policies that are implemented in a consistent manner, and which can channel and sustain its Bebas dan Aktif foreign policy into meaningful international influence.

    The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

    References

    • Heiduk, F., & Wagner, C. (2026). Regional powers and the Indo-Pacific: Comparing India and Indonesia. International Politics. Springer Nature.
    • Umar, A. R. M. (2026). Beyond “middle power”: Postcolonial liminality and the social construction of Indonesia’s foreign policy. International Journal, 81(3), 537–554. SAGE Publications.

    About Simon Hutagalung

    Simon Hutagalung is a retired diplomat from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received his master’s degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in his articles are his own.

    View all posts by Simon Hutagalung →

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