Key Takeaways:
- Indonesia’s large nickel reserves and production complement Latin America’s lithium resources (Argentina ~28 Mt, Bolivia ~23 Mt, Chile ~13 Mt identified resources per USGS 2026), offering a basis for joint battery and EV supply-chain development beyond raw-material trade.
- Geological wealth does not equal industrial strength; converting resources into value requires technology, capital, infrastructure and downstream processing, as illustrated by Indonesia’s nickel policy and the still-undeveloped status of Bolivia’s resources relative to Argentina and Chile.
- Practical steps include a critical-minerals dialogue, cross-regional investment in processing and battery materials, research collaboration, logistics improvements and high environmental-social standards, building on the existing Indonesia–Chile CEPA to create complementary Indo-Pacific production networks.
Indonesia and Latin America share a strategic commonality that is becoming increasingly important in the global economy: abundant mineral resources needed for the energy transition and the development of electric vehicle industries. Indonesia has very large nickel reserves, while Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia possess significant lithium resources.
This commonality should not stop at mining activities and the trade of raw materials. Amid growing global demand for batteries, electric vehicles, energy storage, and clean technologies, Indonesia and Latin American countries have an opportunity to build more strategic economic relations through the development of mineral and industrial supply chains.
Latin America’s Lithium Wealth
The latest data from the Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) shows the enormous lithium potential of Latin America. Argentina has approximately 28 million tons of identified lithium resources, Bolivia around 23 million tons, and Chile around 13 million tons. Together, these three countries have approximately 64 million tons of identified lithium resources. However, resources are not the same as economically mineable reserves.
This distinction is important. Bolivia, for example, has approximately 23 million tons of identified lithium resources but does not yet have lithium reserves classified by the USGS. In contrast, Argentina and Chile have developed commercial production. Argentina is even one of the world’s largest lithium producers and had around 12% of the world’s lithium reserves in 2024, according to the USGS.
This means that geological wealth does not automatically translate into industrial strength. Countries need extraction technology, capital, infrastructure, skilled labor, regulatory certainty, and market access for these resources to generate added value.
Indonesia and the Strength of Nickel
Indonesia has a different but complementary position. The country is one of the world’s major centers of nickel resources and production. The USGS notes that Indonesia’s mine production increased in 2025 as a number of new operations continued to increase output. Global nickel mine production itself was estimated at 3.9 million tons in 2025.
This advantage gives Indonesia an important position in the battery supply chain, although it should be emphasized that not all battery technologies use nickel. Therefore, Indonesia’s strategy should not focus solely on nickel production volumes, but also on processing, battery materials, technology, and the development of higher-value manufacturing industries within the value chain.
This is where the connection with Latin America lies. Argentina and Chile have experience and resources in lithium, while Indonesia has strength in nickel as well as experience in developing mineral processing industries. Bolivia has very large lithium resources and could potentially become an important part of future supply chains if its extraction and industrial capacities develop. These three regions do not have to produce the same products. Rather, differences in their respective advantages can provide the foundation for complementary production chains.
From Commodity Trade to Value Chains
For decades, developing countries have faced a similar problem: exporting raw materials while importing higher-value products. Indonesia is attempting to change this pattern through its nickel downstreaming policy. Latin America faces a similar question in managing lithium, copper, iron ore, and various other strategic minerals.
Therefore, Indonesia–Latin America cooperation should not be limited to mineral trade contracts. Cooperation could be expanded to include technology research, processing investment, battery-material production, electric vehicle development, skilled-worker education, and industrial project financing.
For example, Indonesian companies could cooperate with partners in Argentina or Chile in developing lithium and battery-material supply chains. Universities and research institutions could develop more efficient and environmentally friendly extraction technologies. Financial institutions could support the development of infrastructure and industrial zones.
In this way, economic relations would not stop at “Indonesia buying lithium and Latin America buying Indonesian products,” but could develop into production networks involving investment, technology, trade, and labor from both regions.
Building an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor
The Indo-Pacific concept can be used as a framework for building broader economic connectivity between Asia and Latin American countries along the Pacific Ocean. The Indo-Pacific in an economic context does not necessarily have to be understood as a new organization. It can be understood as an economic space connecting ports, trade, investment, industry, technology, and supply chains between Asia and the Pacific side of Latin America.
Global value chain theory provides an economic foundation for this idea. Modern production does not have to take place in a single country. Each country can participate at the stage that best matches its resources, technology, labor, and infrastructure.
The experience of ASEAN provides a concrete example. According to the ASEAN Investment Report 2025, ASEAN supply chains are becoming increasingly interconnected through electronics, semiconductors, automotive industries, electric vehicles, and the digital sector. Foreign investment does not merely create factories in one country, but connects different countries through supplier and production networks.
The official ASEAN investment website also notes that the region accounts for around 23–24% of global semiconductor exports. Companies are building cross-border production networks to take advantage of differences in the strengths of each economy. This is an important lesson for Indonesia and Latin America. Economic integration does not have to begin with complex regional institutions. It can begin with mutually beneficial economic projects.
From Indonesia–Chile to a Broader Network
Indonesia and Chile already have an initial example. The Indonesia–Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IC-CEPA) came into force in 2019 and created a framework for bilateral trade preferences. According to the Chilean government, trade between the two countries increased from approximately US$298 million in 2018 to US$542 million in 2024, with average annual growth of 10.5% since the agreement came into force.
These figures show that cross-Pacific economic connectivity is not merely an idea. However, the next stage must be more ambitious: transforming trade relations into investment and production relations. Indonesia and Chile can serve as a starting point. Subsequently, cooperation can be expanded to Argentina and Bolivia in lithium supply chains, and then connected with manufacturing and technology centers in Indonesia and other Asian countries.
What Needs to Be Done?
There are at least five steps.
First, Indonesia and Latin American countries need to establish a critical minerals dialogue that maps resources, production capacity, technology, and industrial needs. Second, governments need to encourage cross-regional investment in nickel and lithium processing as well as battery materials. Third, universities and research institutions need to be involved in developing extraction technology, processing, battery recycling, and clean energy technologies.
Fourth, port connectivity, shipping, logistics, and trade financing must be strengthened. Supply chains cannot develop if shipping costs are too high or trade procedures are too complicated. Fifth, downstreaming must be accompanied by strong environmental and social standards. Added value should not be measured only by increased exports, but also by the creation of quality jobs, technology transfer, and the strengthening of domestic companies’ capabilities.
Thus, Indonesia and Latin America have an opportunity to transform their shared mineral wealth into an industrial partnership. Indonesia’s nickel and Latin America’s lithium can become the starting point for broader economic relations. If trade is followed by investment, technology, infrastructure, and production networks, the Indo-Pacific will not merely be a shipping route connecting two regions. It can develop into an economic corridor connecting Latin America’s resources with Asia’s manufacturing capabilities, creating new value chains and giving developing countries a stronger position in the global economy.
